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My aim in this discussion is to argue, not only that government should 
provide funding for the arts, but a fortiori that it should provide funding for 
unconventional, disruptive works of art. 
A frequently voiced objection to government support of the arts is that 
government subsidies may subordinate art to political exigencies. This 
objection is often voiced by those who believe that political art is not 
legitimate art at all, and that supporting it is merely a tactic of advocating for 
certain special interest groups or advancing a certain "leftist" political agenda, 
for example to combat racism or misogyny, or to provide adequate support 
for people with AIDS or the homeless. I believe such beliefs are part of the 
lingering backlash of McCarthyism, and express fear of political repression as 
much as they are collusive examples of it. But interestingly, the most recent, 
egregious case of the manipulation of government funding for the arts in the 
service of a political agenda has come not from the left but from the right, 
with former NEA Chairman John Frohnmayer's politically expedient veto of 
four intermedia applications after they had been recommended for funding 
by a committee of experts, on the grounds that funding them would 
antagonize particular members of the House and Senate into retaliatory action 
against the Endowment.1 
It has been rightly observed that this evil may be even greater without 
governmental support. Governmental support insures that publicly accessible 
works of art will not be confined to those which respond to popular market 
demand. In a culture such as our own, market demand is manipulated by 
advertising, which in turn is the tool of corporate pressures to enforce public 
acceptance of the political and cultural status quo. Part of this enforcement 
procedure involves passive censorship, i.e., withholding institutional 
recognition or representation of views that compete with or criticize the status 
quo. Passive censorship occurs when democratic institutions responsible for 
informing the public of diverse views and values (such as museums, theatres, 
or the print or electronic media) renege on that responsibility, by ignoring 
such alternatives as though they did not exist - thus effectively denying the 
public access to them. Without governmental support, work that questions 
that status quo and the power relations that lie behind it may be subject to 
passive censorship by institutions as well as individual consumers. 
                                                
1 See Elizabeth Hess, "Backing Down Behind Closed Doors at the NEA," The Village 
Voice, Sept. 24, 1991. 
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For example, the Philip Morris Tobacco Company is a major source of 
support in the museum world. It also contributed significantly to the re-
election of Senator Jesse Helms. It obtains market credibility and social status 
through advertising that blatantly associates it with the "high culture" projects 
it supports. As a condition of exhibition funding, Philip Morris has often 
required that the exhibiting institution distribute free cartons of Marlboro 
cigarettes at the opening of such exhibitions. Perhaps it goes without saying 
that Philip Morris has never funded exhibitions devoted to health issues, or 
that explore the issue of institutional racism. If this were the only sort of 
funding source available, such nonconventional exhibitions would receive no 
funding at all. And without such exhibitions and other public venues for 
cultural dissent and criticism, the conventional sensibilities represented by 
such figures as Jesse Helms or the Philip Morris Tobacco Company might 
prevail even more widely than they already do. 
Governmental funding for the arts has, at least up to now, meant a peer 
review process. Responsibility for evaluating applications and selecting 
funding candidates is delegated to a jury or committee of individuals selected 
for their recognized professional competence, experience and achievement in 
the field. On the one hand, this has meant that such individuals are familiar 
with most of the kind of work for which funding is sought, and often with the 
artists or institutions that seek it. This degree of familiarity, and the prior 
professional relationships it presupposes, is the natural consequence of 
having a working knowledge of the field. It does not imply any conflict of 
interest. 
On the other hand, the peer review process requires that the individuals 
making these decisions do so anonymously, and that they are compensated 
only minimally for their participation in the selection process. The outcome is 
a selection of candidates for funding which is disinterested from the 
perspective of personal or political advantage, and expresses the committee's 
best attempt to evaluate the work on its aesthetic merits. I can personally 
attest that these sessions are often lengthy and contentious, and that widely 
disparate opinions must be reconciled through the process of discussion and 
information-gathering before a consensual evaluation can be reached. This is a 
paradigm example of debate on the issues, untainted by considerations of 
personal or political advantage. An artist who receives such funding receives, 
in addition to the palpable good of financial support, the purest expression of 
disinterested peer respect and appreciation it is possible to receive in a largely 
market-driven economy. 
By contrast with the peer review process as it functions in governmental 
funding, that process as it functions in the distribution of funding by private 
foundations is often - although not always - subject to the ideological, 
political, or corporate constraints imposed by the patron. So, for example, 
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Hans Haacke, an artist whose work investigates the issue of corporate control 
of the arts, cannot be expected to receive funding from Philip Morris; nor has 
his work been purchased by major art institutions whose programs depend on 
such corporate support. The public and ideologically transitory nature of 
government makes it the most appropriate source of funding in the arts, 
insofar as such support is supposed to express disinterested aesthetic 
evaluation rather than personal, political or market bias. A government 
committed to the democratic values of freedom of expression and the free 
competition of ideas has a particular obligation to support works of art that 
offer critical alternatives to prevailing power relations. 
One might object to the peer review process on the grounds that it 
subverts democratic values rather than promotes them, by putting the 
evaluation of art in the hands of "experts" who then legislate "aesthetically 
correct" art for the "masses." But this falsely represents the trained 
professionals who serve on those panels as distinct from the "masses" rather 
than their most informed representatives - as though there were no working 
class artists, former scholarship students among the critics, or self-made 
millionaire collectors. Art professionals come to the peer review process from 
all social classes, ethnic and racial backgrounds, and aesthetic orientations 
within our society. On the other hand, it is true that trained professionals are 
trained to an extent that the general public by definition cannot be. The idea 
that informed judgments of aesthetic quality should not determine what art is 
funded for public consumption is a peculiar sort of populism indeed. It is a 
populism that views with suspicion the possibility that art might have a 
beneficial educational effect on the general public; that it might tell the 
viewing public anything that it does not already know. 
Only since the McCarthy era of the 1950s has art retreated from the social 
and didactic role it has always had in the history of Western art, as a source of 
information and new forms of perception and thought for its public. Only 
since then, when it was made very clear to artists as well as other intellectuals 
by politicians that art should be, as it were, seen but not heard, has the 
artworld made a virtue out of social impotence: for only since then has art 
retreated to the role of an abstract, esoteric discipline devoid of content or 
social impact; and only since then has it been possible to level the charge of 
elitism at those whose work does, like so much other intellectual work, 
require specialized skills and information. Specialization is an unavoidable 
consequence of the division of labor between those who are art professionals 
and those who are not. Elitism and esotericism are avoidable consequences of 
the political censorship of "subversive" artistic ideas. Art professionals are 
qualified to serve on peer review panels because they are qualified by their 
training to make, show, and evaluate works of art. It is hard to see how 
anyone could quarrel with that. 
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Art as a pedagogical tool is one thing. But what about works of art that 
disrupt stable social norms, or offend the conventional moral or social 
sensibilities of citizens? Does government have an obligation to fund work 
that undermines social foundations? In the Editor's Introduction to this 
volume,2 Andrew Buchwalter distinguishes between public goods and public 
interests as follows: A public good is the aggregate sum of at least most citizens' 
individual preferences; examples would include a public library, health care, 
or an opera house. A public interest, by contrast, is something that serves the 
ends of public life, i.e., the community itself. Examples might include an 
equitable sales tax or an adequate police force. Whereas a public good 
expresses the aggregate of individual preferences, a public interest may but 
need not do so. Instead it may embody something that would be good for 
society in general, independently of what individuals prefer for themselves. 
Now it might be argued that unconventional works of art are neither a public 
good nor a public interest. Clearly they are not a public good, since they 
violate most individual preferences, by definition of "unconventional." It 
might be claimed that they are not a public interest either, because they 
undermine the most basic end of public life, namely the preservation of social 
stability through a system of normative conventions that coordinate behavior 
among individuals, from all levels from the personal to the social. 
Consider the performance work of Karen Finley. Finley violates 
conventional images of women by, for example, adopting the pornographic 
masculine vernacular in some of her performance monologues, as well as by 
smearing her body with various foods, and by naming and depicting acts of 
sexual violation. These in addition to many other disturbing elements are 
woven together in a hypnotizing drama that is often as painful as it is 
assaultive on conventional sensibilities. There are many arguments that can be 
given regarding the importance of Finley's work: its release into a shared 
social sphere of a subconscious and subterranean level of experience often 
considered inaccessible to women; its cathartic effects on an audience 
socialized to repress painful experiences of an intimate nature; its importance 
as a political strategy of naming, depicting and confronting the systematic and 
daily violation of women's bodies; and so forth. Rather than developing any 
of these arguments, I want to address the question of how it can ever be in the 
public interest to publicly display such works of art that disrupt or violate 
stable social conventions - of behavior, social or political roles, or aesthetic 
practices. 
The answer is obvious: It is in the public interest to disrupt those 
conventions which are unnecessarily restrictive for some, such that those 
restrictions serve the interests of others who unfairly compete with them for 
                                                
2 See also Andrew Buchwalter, "Philosophy, Culture, and Public Policy." 
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the resources, power, and social status necessary to gain public support for a 
favored ideology. So, for example, a work of art that disrupts the prevailing 
image of corporate sponsorship as beneficial and politically neutral, as Hans 
Haacke's work does, is in the public interest, even though it undermines the 
convention of personal and social compliance with corporate demands in the 
workplace. Similarly, a work of art that disrupts conventional expectations of 
women as passive receptors of sexual and social violation, such as Karen 
Finley's work does, is in the public interest, even though it undermines 
conventional behavior by and toward women in personal and social 
relationships. It is because these works assault oppressive conventional 
attitudes that empower institutions at the expense of individuals and men at 
the expense of women respectively that they are in the public interest, even if 
they cannot be, by definition, objects of personal preference for most 
individuals. 
This is to suggest that unconventional works of art are in the public 
interest because they promote - rather than require or presuppose - tolerance; 
and because they conduce to the evolution of social norms that maximize 
autonomy and individuality, rather than conformity and self-censorship. No 
one would argue that social disruption is a good in itself. However, social 
stability is also not an end in itself. Social stability may serve the harmful 
function of entrenching the repression of personal sensibility, individual self-
actualization, or social self-determination; or it may serve the beneficial 
function of coordinating expectations among those recognized to differ in 
their personal, social or aesthetic values - as, in fact, we all do. Moral 
relativists argue that, in the last analysis, all coordinating conventions are 
arbitrary means of insuring social equilibrium, including moral ones. 
Nevertheless, some such conventions are more arbitrary than others.  Social 
conventions that repress individual self-expression merely because it takes an 
unconventional form are harmful because they protect provinciality and 
philistinism at the expense of individuality. And they are arbitrary because 
there is no justification, beyond the stabilizing function of the convention 
itself, for enforcing it. 
By contrast, there is a nonarbitrary justification for enforcing fundamental 
moral conventions - specifically, those moral norms that prohibit physical 
harm to others. Calibrating degrees of harm from the physical to the 
psychological and from the physically to the intellectually assaultive is to start 
down a treacherously slippery slope, and I will not attempt it here. But to 
agree that art should not inflict physical pain or desecrate the dead (say) is not 
thereby to support censorship or governmental repression of such work. Any 
marginalized individual or group knows how effective a community's 
nonofficial social sanctions can be in discouraging such work: Through 
ostracism, neglect, or social disapproval we discourage a great deal of 
potential social benefit. We would do better to turn these potent, nonofficial 
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forms of social punishment to discouraging work that is genuinely morally 
harmful. 
But is there not something hypocritical, or disingenuous at best, about 
demanding government support for works of art that then subvert the very 
social order that supports them? I think not. There is an important distinction 
to be made between government (or the state) and the social community (or 
civil society). Demanding government support for unconventional works of 
art that question the social order is not asking government to cut off the 
branch it's sitting on, because government and the social order are not the 
same. In a democratic society, the function of government is legislative, 
executive and judicative of norms that not only reflect but also influence and 
shape the development of the social community that elects it. A democratic 
government has a responsibility, not merely to permit but to promote the 
democratic values of tolerance, diversity of opinion and values, and freedom 
of speech, thought and information in the society it governs. To demand that 
the government fund unconventional works of art is to demand that it fulfill 
its responsibility to the community to encourage the democratic values it 
purports to represent. 
Works of art that question prevailing ideologies or power relationships 
may be disruptive and offensive because they disturb the settled presumption 
that prevailing social roles, practices and power relationships are natural and 
inevitable. They thereby call into question whether the particular form 
democracy assumes in our troubled society is the most fully realized form 
democracy can take. In questioning the social power relations that define our 
prevailing conception of democracy, unconventional works of art thereby 
conduce to the evolution of social norms more appreciative of the questioners, 
respectful of the powerless and tolerant of the unconventional; and thereby 
reaffirm the ultimate value of democracy itself. Unconventional works of art 
are in the public interest - hence deserving of government support - because 
they promote coordinating conventions for the inherently unconventional, i.e., 
for fully realized individuals whose preferences and tastes are peculiarly their 
own. 
 
Notes 
An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the American 
Philosophical Association Eastern Division Convention in New York City on 
30 December 1991, as comments to Andrew Buchwalter's "Philosophy, 
Culture, and Public Policy." I am grateful to him and to members of the 
audience to that colloquium for discussion that has considerably improved 
the current version. 
